NOTE
Uncharted Waters: The Supreme Court Plots the Course to
a Constitutional Bright-Line Restriction on Punitive
Awards in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker*
I. Introduction
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the United States Supreme Court
established for the first time in its history a mathematical bright line to limit
the amount of a punitive damages award.1 The Court reduced a punitive award
levied against Exxon in the aftermath of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill from
$2.5 billion to $507.5 million, the maximum amount allowed under the
Court’s newly created 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.2 Before
the Exxon decision, the Supreme Court had consistently expressed an
unwillingness to adopt a bright-line ratio when addressing constitutional
challenges to the size of state punitive damages awards.3 Exxon, however, did
not involve a constitutional analysis according to Justice Souter’s majority
opinion.4 Instead, the Court reviewed the punitive damages award for
conformity with principles of maritime law—an area where the Court may
exercise its federal common law authority.5 Because the Court acted in its
capacity as “a common law court of last review,”6 it was not limited by the
Constitution and “was free to craft a rule based purely on policy
considerations.”7
* The author wishes to thank Associate Dean Liesa Richter of the University of
Oklahoma College of Law for her advice, support, and encouragement during the writing of this
note.
1. See 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008) (holding that a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages marks the “fair upper limit” in maritime cases); see also discussion infra Parts II-III.
2. See id. at 2611, 2634.
3. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“We
decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.”);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (“[W]e have consistently rejected the
notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula . . . .”); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (“We need not, and indeed we
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.” (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991))).
4. See 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2629.
7. Lester Sotsky & Daniel J. Stuart, Punitives Post-‘Exxon’?, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 2008,
at 12; see also infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
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The most significant question after Exxon is whether the decision will have
any effect outside the narrow context of maritime law. The early reaction from
both courts and commentators suggests that Exxon is limited in scope and
application to maritime cases.8 This note explores the possibility that Exxon
could have a broader impact. Although the majority attempted to confine its
new bright-line rule to the unique maritime context of the case,9 a close
reading of the decision, coupled with an understanding of the Court’s recent
punitive damages jurisprudence, leads to the conclusion that Exxon is likely
to have far-reaching implications outside the maritime arena. Specifically, the
Supreme Court laid the groundwork for adopting a constitutional bright-line
ratio by embracing the simplicity and certainty of a quantitative approach to
limiting punitive awards.10
Part II of this note discusses the Supreme Court’s punitive damages
jurisprudence before Exxon, focusing primarily on the Court’s substantive due
process cases and the evolution of constitutional protections against excessive
punitive damages awards. Part III examines the Exxon case in depth and
includes a statement of the facts and procedural history, an explanation of the
majority opinion, and a discussion of the important points in the concurring
and dissenting opinions. Part IV explains four major reasons why the Exxon
decision will likely extend beyond the maritime context and spill over into the
Court’s constitutional framework: (1) the fact that the same considerations
8. See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 876 n.9 (8th Cir. 2008)
(noting that Exxon does not mandate a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages “as a
matter of constitutional law”); Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing
that Exxon draws a distinction between federal common law claims of excessiveness and
constitutional claims of excessiveness); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F. Supp. 2d
841, 859 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (explaining that Exxon does not mean that “the Constitution
prohibits a punitive damage award greater than the amount awarded for compensatory
damages”); VICKI LAWRENCE MACDOUGALL, 8 OKLAHOMA PRACTICE SERIES: OKLAHOMA
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 12:17(C)(2)(b), at 82 (Supp. 2009-2010) (noting that Exxon
“judicially created a 1:1 ratio rule under maritime law and has no real precedential value outside
the limited scope of admiralty”); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Narrow Ruling on Punitive Damages,
TRIAL, Sept. 2008, at 62, 63 (“[T]he Court was clear that it was dealing only with punitive
damages in maritime cases. At most, its reasoning can be applied to other areas of federal
common law where punitive damages are allowed.”); cf. Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 429, 484 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that “[a]lthough Exxon is a maritime law case,
it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much broader application,” but
then concluding that “the 1:1 ratio imposed by Exxon is limited to cases such as Exxon itself”
and that “Exxon does not automatically limit an award of punitive damages under § 1983 to an
amount equal to compensatory damages”).
9. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
10. See id. at 2629 (describing quantitative standards as “more rigorous” than current
constitutional standards and lauding them for “eliminating unpredictable outlying punitive
awards”).
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supporting Exxon’s ratio also underlie the Court’s due process approach, (2)
the Court’s explicit recognition that verbal constraints fail to adequately curb
excessive punitive awards, (3) the majority’s express intermingling of Exxon
with due process precedent, and (4) the Supreme Court’s general hostility to
large punitive awards and recent activism in the area of punitive damages.
Part V briefly summarizes and concludes this note.
II. The Supreme Court’s Use of Substantive Due Process to Limit Punitive
Damages Awards
Throughout most of its history, “[t]he Supreme Court has . . . taken a
relatively laissez-faire approach toward punitive damages law, viewing
punitive awards as a discretionary function of the state common law courts.”11
As recently as 1989, the Court stated that “where state law provides the basis
of decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in
question, and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount,
are questions of state law.”12 Everything changed in the early 1990s, however.
Since 1991, the Supreme Court has handed down a series of cases recognizing
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places substantive
and procedural limitations on punitive damages awards.13 These cases mark
a dramatic shift in the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence “from an
essentially hands-off approval of common-law practice for awarding and
reviewing punitive damages to an express recognition of a right not to be
subjected to grossly excessive punitive awards.”14
A. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip: The Court Hints at a
Substantive Due Process Right to a Reasonable Punitive Damages Award
The Supreme Court first applied the Due Process Clause to a punitive
damages award in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.15 In that case,
the plaintiff sued Pacific Mutual under a theory of vicarious liability for the

11. Jenny Miao Jiang, Comment, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of Federal Intervention,
Constitutionalization, and Substantive Due Process in Punitive Damages Law, 94 CAL. L. REV.
793, 796 (2006); see also Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the
Court That Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 468 (2005) (“For more
than two hundred years, the Court deferred to the states’ choice of substantive, procedural, and
evidentiary rules for assessing and awarding punitive damages.”).
12. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989).
13. Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic
Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 233, 268 (2003).
14. Id. at 268.
15. See 499 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1991).
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fraud committed by one of its agents.16 The jury awarded the plaintiff
$200,000 in compensatory damages and more than $800,000 in punitive
damages.17 The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.18 In upholding the punitive damages
award,19 the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the procedures used by the lower
courts in Alabama to impose and review the award.20 The Court found that the
award satisfied due process because of the proper provision of procedural
safeguards—the trial court had provided adequate jury instructions, and both
the trial court and the Alabama Supreme Court had conducted appropriate
postverdict review.21
Though the Haslip Court relied primarily on notions of procedural due
process, the case also contained an important substantive due process
component.22 Much of the language in the opinion suggested that the Court
was concerned with the size of punitive damages awards. For example, Justice
Blackmun noted the Court’s “concern about punitive damages that ‘run
wild.’”23 The Court also feared that unlimited jury or judicial discretion in
setting punitive damages “may invite extreme results that jar one’s
constitutional sensibilities.”24 Although the Court refused to “draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case,”25 it foreshadowed the
future importance of the substantive element of the Due Process Clause when
it explained that concerns of “reasonableness” factor into the constitutional
analysis.26 Moreover, the Court hinted at the relevance of ratios when it
observed that the punitive award imposed against Pacific Mutual, which
totaled more than four times the amount of compensatory damages, might have
been close to but did not “cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety.”27
This aspect of the majority opinion prompted Justice Scalia to write
separately to emphasize his view that the Court should focus solely on
16. Id. at 5-6.
17. See id. at 7 n.2.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 23-24.
20. See id. at 18-23.
21. See id. at 23-24.
22. See DeCamp, supra note 13, at 270 n.201; Jiang, supra note 11, at 796; Rustad, supra
note 11, at 508 n.331.
23. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 23-24.
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procedural due process.28 Because the procedures at issue in the case accorded
with the traditional practice of American courts and did not violate the Bill of
Rights, Justice Scalia argued that there was no need for the Court to consider
“fairness” or “reasonableness.”29
B. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.: The Supreme Court
Determines That the Due Process Clause Places Substantive Limitations on
Punitive Damages Awards
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Supreme Court
explicitly addressed a substantive due process challenge to a significant
punitive damages award.30 The case arose out of a dispute over oil and gas
development rights.31 Although TXO knew that Alliance had good title to the
oil and gas rights at issue, it tried to cloud Alliance’s title by recording a faulty
quitclaim deed as part of a fraudulent scheme to renegotiate the parties’ royalty
agreement.32 TXO then brought a declaratory judgment action against
Alliance, and Alliance counterclaimed alleging slander of title.33 At trial, the
jury found TXO liable for slander of title and awarded Alliance $19,000 in
compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages.34
The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether “a $10 million
punitive damages award—an award 526 times greater than the actual damages
awarded by the jury—is so excessive that it must be deemed an arbitrary
deprivation of property without due process of law.”35 According to the
plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court’s previous decisions
established “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes substantive limits ‘beyond which penalties may not go.’”36 The
plurality returned to the Court’s language in Haslip and once again refused to
“draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and
the constitutionally unacceptable.”37 Instead, Justice Stevens reiterated that
whether a punitive award is “grossly excessive” depends at least in part on a
“general concer[n] of reasonableness.”38
28. See id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
29. Id.
30. See 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993) (plurality opinion).
31. See id. at 447.
32. See id. at 447-49.
33. Id. at 449-50.
34. See id. at 450-51.
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id. at 453-54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)).
37. Id. at 458 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
38. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).

502

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:497

Applying this broad principle to the facts, the plurality concluded that the
punitive award did not violate due process.39 According to Justice Stevens, the
award was not unconstitutionally excessive considering “the magnitude of the
potential harm that the defendant’s conduct would have caused to its intended
victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to
other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred.”40 Thus, a plurality of the Supreme Court established that a large
disparity between the size of a punitive damages award and the amount of
compensatory damages does not, without more, constitute a violation of
substantive due process.41 The plurality failed, however, to provide specific
guidelines that courts should consider when confronted with challenges to the
size of punitive awards.42 This led Justice O’Connor to criticize the
subjectivity of the plurality’s approach and to argue that the Court’s judgments
“should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”43
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment because
he believed that the punitive award satisfied procedural due process.44 He
refused to join the plurality opinion “since it ma[de] explicit what was implicit
in Haslip: the existence of a so-called ‘substantive due process’ right that
punitive damages be reasonable.”45 According to Justice Scalia, there is no
“constitutional right to a substantively correct ‘reasonableness’
determination.”46 As long as lower courts comply with the requirements of
procedural due process, the Court has no business disturbing punitive damages
awards.47
C. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: The Court Establishes
“Guideposts” to Determine Whether a Punitive Damages Award Comports
with Substantive Due Process
Just three years after TXO, the Supreme Court in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore found a punitive damages award to be excessive and in violation
39. See id. at 462.
40. Id. at 460. The Court noted that the value of the oil and gas rights, and hence the value
of the royalty obligation that TXO fraudulently attempted to renegotiate, was in the millions.
See id. at 460-61. Thus, although the only actual harm to Alliance was the cost of litigation, the
potential harm if TXO’s scheme had succeeded was enormous. See id. at 462.
41. See id. at 462.
42. See id. at 480 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The plurality opinion erects not a single
guidepost to help other courts find their way through this area.”).
43. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)).
44. See id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 471.
47. See id.
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of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause for the first time.48
The facts of the case are relatively simple. Dr. Ira Gore brought suit against
BMW after he discovered that his black sports sedan had been repainted before
he purchased it.49 As part of a national policy, BMW did not disclose repairs
to cars damaged during the course of manufacture or transportation if the
repair cost did not exceed 3% of the retail price of the car.50 The cost of
repainting Dr. Gore’s car had only totaled around 1.5% of its retail price;
consequently, BMW had sold the car as new.51
The jury awarded Dr. Gore $4000 in compensatory damages—the
difference in value between his car and a car that had not been refinished—and
$4 million in punitive damages on the grounds that BMW’s nondisclosure
policy “constituted ‘gross, oppressive or malicious’ fraud.”52 The jury arrived
at the punitive damages number by multiplying the actual damages by
1000—the approximate number of vehicles BMW had sold nationwide for
more than they were worth.53 The Alabama Supreme Court remitted the award
to $2 million, finding that it was improper for the jury to factor in car sales that
occurred outside of Alabama.54 That court, however, did not adequately
explain how it arrived at the $2 million number.55 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify the standard for determining whether a punitive
award is unconstitutionally excessive.56
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first reiterated the principle that
“[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State
from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.”57 He then
explained that “[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition.”58 Further, he noted that states have tremendous flexibility in
determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages in various types of

48. See 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996).
49. Id. at 563.
50. Id. at 563-64.
51. Id. at 564.
52. Id. at 564-65 (quoting ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993)).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 567.
55. See id. at 567 & nn.10-11. The Alabama Supreme Court claimed to use a “comparative
analysis” that considered punitive damages awards in cases from Alabama and other states
involving misrepresentation in the sale of automobiles; however, the court neither cited any
such cases nor otherwise documented how it arrived at the $2 million figure. Id.
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp. 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)).
58. Id. at 568 (citing, inter alia, Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991)).
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cases.59 Despite this “homage to federalist principles,”60 however, the Court
ultimately reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court.61
As in Haslip and TXO, the Gore majority refused to draw a bright line
marking the constitutional outer limit for punitive damages awards,62 but the
Court stated that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the
severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”63 To that end, the Court
erected three “guideposts” to help determine whether an award is excessive
under the Due Process Clause: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct, (2) the ratio between the harm or potential harm suffered
by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the comparison of the
punitive award to civil penalties that could be imposed for similar
misconduct.64
The Court referred to reprehensibility as “the most important indicium of
the reasonableness of a punitive damages award”65 and found that BMW’s
conduct was not especially reprehensible, in part because it caused only
economic harm and did not involve deliberate wrongdoing or an evil motive.66
With respect to the ratio guidepost, the Court stated that high ratios may be
appropriate where egregious conduct has resulted in minimal compensatory
damages or where injury is difficult to detect or value.67 Accordingly, the
Court “rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple
mathematical formula,”68 but noted that “[w]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 500
to 1, . . . the award must surely ‘raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.’”69
Finally, the Court observed that the maximum possible civil sanction in any
state for BMW’s conduct was only a fraction of the $2 million punitive
award.70 After analyzing the three guideposts, the Court concluded that “the
59. Id.
60. Rustad, supra note 11, at 509.
61. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586.
62. Id. at 585.
63. Id. at 574.
64. Id. at 574-75.
65. Id. at 575.
66. See id. at 575-80.
67. Id. at 582.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
70. See id. at 584. The maximum statutory fine in Alabama for violating the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA) was only $2000, while some other states had maximum fines
ranging between $5000 and $10,000. See id. & nn.39-40 (citing seven states’ civil penalty
provisions for DTPA violations).
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grossly excessive award imposed in th[e] case transcend[ed] the constitutional
limit.”71
Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent criticizing the majority for its
“unjustified incursion into the province of state governments.”72 According
to Justice Scalia, due process requires only that a defendant have “an
opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a [punitive award] in state court,”
not that such an award “actually be reasonable.”73 He chided the majority for
creating a new constitutional standard constrained only by “the Justices’
subjective assessment of . . . ‘reasonableness’”74 and ultimately concluded that
the majority’s “‘guideposts’ mark[ed] a road to nowhere” because they failed
to provide any actual guidance.75
D. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell: The Supreme
Court Creates a Presumption Against Punitive-to-Compensatory Ratios
Greater than 9:1
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme
Court used principles of substantive due process to overturn a punitive
damages award for only the second time.76 The case arose out of State Farm’s
bad-faith failure to settle a claim against its insured, Curtis Campbell, within
the limits of his automobile insurance policy.77 While driving with his wife,
Campbell attempted to pass six vans on a two-lane highway by crossing into
the oncoming-traffic lane.78 Todd Ospital was driving in the opposite direction
71. Id. at 585-86.
72. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Scalia. See id.
at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into
territory traditionally within the States’ domain . . . .”).
73. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 605. Justice Scalia went on to describe the consequences of the Court’s new
approach:
The legal significance of these “guideposts” is nowhere explored, but their
necessary effect is to establish federal standards governing the hitherto exclusively
state law of damages. Apparently (though it is by no means clear) all three federal
“guideposts” can be overridden if “necessary to deter future misconduct,”—a
loophole that will encourage state reviewing courts to uphold awards as necessary
for the “adequat[e] protect[ion]” of state consumers. By effectively requiring state
reviewing courts to concoct rationalizations—whether within the “guideposts” or
through the loophole—to justify the intuitive punitive reactions of state juries, the
Court accords neither category of institution the respect it deserves.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
76. See 538 U.S. 408, 416, 429 (2003).
77. See id. at 413-14.
78. Id. at 412.
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and was forced to swerve into a vehicle driven by Robert Slusher to avoid
colliding head-on with Campbell.79 The collision killed Ospital and left
Slusher permanently disabled.80 Slusher and Ospital’s estate (Ospital) brought
suit against Campbell, and investigators and witnesses quickly reached a
consensus that Campbell was at fault.81 Nevertheless, State Farm insisted on
contesting liability and refused offers to settle the claims for the policy limit
of $25,000 per claimant.82 To make matters worse, State Farm assured the
Campbells that their assets were not in jeopardy and that they were not liable.83
Despite State Farm’s assurances, however, the jury found Campbell entirely
at fault and returned a judgment against him in the amount of $185,849, which
was $135,849 more than Campbell’s policy limit.84 State Farm initially
refused to cover the excess liability, even telling the Campbells that they might
have to sell their property to pay the judgment.85 Shortly thereafter, Campbell
struck an agreement with Slusher and Ospital whereby Campbell would enlist
Slusher’s and Ospital’s attorneys to sue State Farm for bad faith in return for
Slusher’s and Ospital’s promises not to enforce their judgment against the
Campbells.86 State Farm finally agreed to pay the amount of the judgment in
excess of the policy limits, but the Campbells pursued claims for bad faith,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, ultimately securing a
judgment against State Farm for $1 million in compensatory damages and
$145 million in punitive damages.87
The Supreme Court agreed to hear State Farm’s appeal to determine
whether “an award of $145 million in punitive damages, where full
compensatory damages are $1 million, is excessive and in violation of the Due
Process Clause.”88 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated the nowfamiliar principle that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor.”89 The Court then turned to the Gore guideposts,
beginning with reprehensibility.90 The majority explained that the Utah
79. Id. at 412-13.
80. Id. at 413.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. In addition, “Slusher and Ospital would receive 90 percent of any verdict against
State Farm.” Id. at 414.
87. See id. at 414-15.
88. Id. at 412.
89. Id. at 416 (citing, inter alia, BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996)).
90. See id. at 418-19.
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Supreme Court erred in finding State Farm’s conduct to be especially
reprehensible, because that court considered other dissimilar acts by State
Farm and conduct by State Farm that occurred in other jurisdictions.91 Justice
Kennedy criticized the Utah Supreme Court for “adjudicat[ing] the merits of
other parties’ hypothetical claims against [State Farm] under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis”92 and using the case “as a platform to expose, and
punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm’s operations throughout the
country.”93 The Court concluded that the reprehensibility of State Farm’s
conduct should be assessed only in light of the specific conduct that harmed
the Campbells.94
The most important aspect of the Court’s opinion was its discussion of the
ratio guidepost. The Court again refused to adopt “a bright-line ratio which
a punitive damages award cannot exceed,” but stated, “Our jurisprudence and
the principles it has now established demonstrate . . . that . . . few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”95 The Court also explained
that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process . . .
than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1 or, in this case, of 145 to 1.”96
These statements had the practical effect of creating a new rule of
constitutional law: punitive-to-compensatory ratios greater than 9:1
presumptively violate due process.97
Next, the Court reiterated its observation from Gore that higher ratios may
be appropriate where an especially egregious act has resulted in low
compensatory damages or where injury is difficult to detect or value.98 Given
the context, the Court may have included this comment to describe the types
of cases where lower courts may deviate from the new single-digit rule.99 The
Court then continued with its most significant statement in light of the recent
Exxon decision: “When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee.”100 This language strongly suggests that the
91. See id. at 420-24.
92. Id. at 423.
93. Id. at 420.
94. Id. at 424.
95. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. See DeCamp, supra note 13, at 234; Andrew C.W. Lund, The Road from Nowhere?
Punitive Damage Ratios After BMW v. Gore and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell, 20 TOURO L. REV. 943, 982 (2005).
98. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
99. See Lund, supra note 97, at 982-83.
100. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added).
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Constitution prohibits ratios greater than 1:1 in cases with substantial
compensatory damages, though the Court has yet to explicitly adopt such a
rule.101
After thoroughly analyzing the reprehensibility and ratio guideposts, the
Court paid little attention to the third guidepost—penalties for comparable
misconduct.102 Ultimately, the Court held that “application of the Gore
guideposts to the facts of this case . . . likely would justify a punitive damages
award at or near the amount of compensatory damages,”103 once again
suggesting 1:1 as the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.
The case was “neither close nor difficult,”104 and because the $145 million
punitive award “was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of
the defendant,” the Court remanded the case back to the Utah courts with
instructions to recalculate the punitive damages.105
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for unduly trampling on
principles of federalism.106 She noted that a state’s decision “in setting singledigit and 1-to-1 benchmarks could hardly be questioned,” but that the Court’s
decision to impose numerical controls “under the banner of substantive due
process” was “boldly out of order.”107 Moreover, she denounced the
majority’s transformation of the flexible Gore guideposts into “marching
orders” for the states.108
The Supreme Court’s due process cases reflect a broad and relatively quick
jurisprudential shift in the area of punitive damages. As recently as twenty
years ago, the Court left punitive damages almost entirely up to the individual
states.109 Then, in the 1990s, the Court recognized and began to define
constitutional limitations on the size of punitive awards, while still leaving
states with a significant degree of flexibility.110 Finally, in 2003, the Court
eliminated much of the remaining state discretion by creating a presumption
against punitive-to-compensatory ratios greater than 9:1 and suggesting 1:1 as
the maximum ratio in some types of cases.111
101. But see DeCamp, supra note 13, at 234 (claiming that the Court “arguably” created a
1:1 maximum ratio in cases with substantial compensatory damages).
102. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428. The Court briefly mentioned that the punitive
damages award “dwarfed” the $10,000 maximum fine for an act of fraud. Id.
103. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 418.
105. Id. at 429.
106. See id. at 438-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 438.
108. Id. at 439.
109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
110. See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
111. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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III. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Supreme Court Expressly Limits the
Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages to 1:1 in Maritime Cases
In 2008, yet another punitive damages case came before the Court.112 This
time, however, the dispute arose under federal maritime law and provided the
Court with an opportunity to work with a clean slate.113
A. Facts and Procedural History
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck a reef off the
Alaskan coast, dumping approximately eleven million gallons of crude oil into
Prince William Sound.114 The captain that evening, Joseph Hazelwood, “had
completed a 28-day alcohol treatment program while employed by Exxon . . .
but dropped out of a prescribed follow-up program and stopped going to
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.”115 Hazelwood continued to drink after the
program, and there was evidence suggesting that his superiors at Exxon were
aware of his relapse and even drank with him.116 Additionally, although
Exxon’s company policy prohibited any employees from working on board a
ship within four hours of drinking alcohol, Exxon officials failed to monitor
Hazelwood after he returned from the alcohol treatment program.117 According
to witnesses, Hazelwood drank at least five double vodkas before the ship left
port on the night of the accident, “enough that a non-alcoholic would have
passed out.”118
Because of poor weather conditions when the Valdez set sail, the tanker was
forced to take an alternate route that diverted it from the usual outbound
shipping lane.119 Accordingly, the vessel steered east across the inbound lane
to a less hazardous path.120 This maneuver pointed the ship directly toward an
underwater reef near Bligh Island and thus required Hazelwood to turn the
tanker back west into the outbound lane at a specific point north of the reef.121
Just before the required turn, Captain Hazelwood, the only individual on board
licensed to navigate that particular stretch of the sound, inexplicably left the
112. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
113. See id. at 2611, 2626.
114. See id. at 2611, 2613.
115. Id. at 2612.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215,
1236 (9th Cir. 2001)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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bridge and retired to his cabin “to do paperwork.”122 He also placed the ship
on autopilot, increasing its speed and making the turn far more difficult for the
officer and the helmsman who remained on the bridge.123 “For reasons that
remain a mystery,” the officer and helmsman did not make the turn, and the
Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef.124 To make matters worse, Hazelwood
tried and failed to rock the tanker off the reef when he returned to the bridge,
an action which may have caused even more oil to spill.125 Relying on a blood
test taken several hours after the accident, experts estimated that Hazelwood’s
blood-alcohol level at the time of the spill must have been about “three times
the legal limit for driving in most States.”126
In the wake of the accident, Exxon spent approximately $2.1 billion in
cleanup efforts and agreed to pay substantial fines and restitution after
pleading guilty to criminal violations of various federal statutes.127 Although
the company also settled civil suits brought by the United States and the State
of Alaska, as well as several claims brought by private parties, many plaintiffs
refused to settle their claims.128 The case that is the subject of this note began
in federal district court as a consolidation of the remaining civil cases against
Exxon.129 After dividing the plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages into
three different classes—commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and
landowners—the trial court created a mandatory class comprising all plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages.130 Members of that mandatory class, collectively
referred to as “Baker,” became the respondents in the case before the Supreme
Court.131
Exxon stipulated to its negligence and liability for compensatory damages
before trial, so the trial court adjudicated only three issues: (1) the amount of
compensatory damages, (2) whether Exxon was liable for punitive damages,
and (3) the amount of punitive damages.132 After a jury trial, the trial court
calculated “relevant” compensatory damages totaling $507.5 million133 and left
undisturbed the jury’s award of $5 billion in punitive damages against

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2612-13.
Id. at 2613.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2634 (citing In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1063 (D. Alaska 2002)).
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Exxon.134 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the issue of the size
of the punitive damages award twice in light of the Supreme Court’s
substantive due process cases before finally remitting the award to $2.5
billion.135 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine “whether
the punitive damages awarded against Exxon . . . were excessive as a matter
of maritime common law.”136
B. The Majority Opinion of Justice Souter
In a 5–3 decision,137 the Supreme Court held that a 1:1 ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages marks the upper limit in maritime cases with “no
earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness.”138 Thus, the Court vacated the
$2.5 billion punitive damages award and remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit with instructions to remit the award to $507.5 million, an amount equal
to the compensatory damages.139
134. See id. at 2614.
135. Id. (citing In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (first remand);
472 F.3d 600, 601, 625 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (second remand); 490 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th
Cir. 2007) (remitment)).
136. Id. (emphasis added). The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty
and maritime cases. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006)
(authorizing the federal courts to exercise exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction). This
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction extends to all cases that arise on navigable waters. See In
re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 14 (1891). The judiciary has been largely responsible for the
development of maritime law, which the Supreme Court has described as “an amalgam of
traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.” E. River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 (1986). Absent a statute on
point, this judge-made law applies in maritime cases. Id. at 864. Because the Exxon Valdez oil
spill occurred on navigable waters and no federal statute addressed maritime punitive damages,
principles of maritime common law governed the case. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
137. Justice Souter, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas formed the five-member majority. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611. Justice Stevens,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part. See id. Justice
Alito owned Exxon stock and recused himself. Lewis Goldshore & Marsha Wolf, The Mother
of All Oil Spills: U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Punitive Damages, N.J. L.J., Aug. 18, 2008, at
38, 38.
138. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2633.
139. Id. at 2614, 2634. Before considering the punitive damages award, the Court addressed
two preliminary questions: (1) “whether maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive
damages on the basis of the acts of managerial agents,” and (2) “whether the Clean Water Act
(CWA) forecloses the award of punitive damages in maritime spill cases.” Id. at 2614 (citation
omitted). The Court was equally divided on the derivative liability question and therefore
unable to order reversal on that ground, leaving the Ninth’s Circuit’s decision allowing
derivative liability undisturbed. See id. at 2615-16. With respect to the preemption question,
the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the CWA does not preempt common law punitive
damages remedies. See id. at 2618-19.
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The Court began its discussion by noting that the issue of punitive damages
in maritime law is a matter “which falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to
decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of
Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”140 The
Court then set forth a broad history of punitive damages law, discussing the
nature and purpose of punitive damages, the various procedures used for
imposing punitive damages, scholarly criticism of punitive damages, and the
Court’s constitutional punitive damages jurisprudence.141 From this history,
the Court concluded that “[t]he real problem . . . is the stark unpredictability
of punitive awards.”142 In language reflecting the same concerns underlying
the Court’s approach in Gore and State Farm, Justice Souter remarked that this
unpredictability is problematic because “[c]ourts of law are concerned with
fairness as consistency.”143 According to the Court, outlier awards that
“subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding
compensatories” create unfairness because they are not predictable.144
With this idea in mind, the Court turned to the specifics of Exxon’s claim
and immediately tried to distinguish the case at bar from its substantive due
process cases:
Today’s enquiry differs from due process review because the
case arises under federal maritime jurisdiction, and we are
reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather
than the outer limit allowed by due process; we are examining the
verdict in the exercise of federal maritime common law authority,
which precedes and should obviate any application of the
constitutional standard. . . .
Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not their
intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of regulating
them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with
this Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of
statute.145
140. Id. at 2619.
141. Id. at 2620-26.
142. Id. at 2625.
143. Compare id. (emphasis added) with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 417 (2003), and BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
144. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2610; see also id. at 2627 (noting that the unpredictability of
punitive damages awards “is in tension with the function of the awards as punitive, just because
of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries in a system
whose commonly held notion of law rests on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another”
(emphasis added)).
145. Id. at 2626-27 (emphasis added).

2010]

NOTE

513

The Court then made explicit that principles of fairness would guide its
common law analysis, reasoning that “a penalty should be reasonably
predictable in its severity” so that defendants know in advance the possible
consequences of various types of conduct.146
To accomplish the goal of bringing uniformity and predictability to punitive
damages in maritime law, the Court chose from three different approaches,
“one verbal and two quantitative.”147 The Court quickly rejected the verbal
approach—regulation through the use of jury instructions and judicial review
criteria.148 Using reasoning that necessarily undermines the Gore guideposts,149
the Court concluded that verbal formulations offer nonspecific guidance and
fail to insure against unpredictable outlying awards.150 Justice Souter wrote,
“[O]ur experience with attempts to produce consistency in the analogous
business of criminal sentencing leaves us doubtful that anything but a
quantified approach will work.”151 The Court also stated that “as long as there
are no punitive-damages guidelines, corresponding to the federal and state
[criminal] sentencing guidelines, it is inevitable that the specific amount of
punitive damages awarded whether by a judge or by a jury will be
arbitrary.”152 Thus, the Court reasoned that a quantified approach with “more
rigorous standards than the constitutional limit” was necessary to “eliminat[e]
unpredictable outlying punitive awards.”153
Next, the Court considered the first quantitative option—“a hard dollar cap
on punitive damages.”154 The majority gave two reasons for eliminating this
alternative. First, no particular dollar figure would be appropriate in all cases
since there is no such thing as a “standard” tort or contract injury.155 Second,
the judiciary would not be as effective as a legislature in implementing a hard
cap, because the judiciary, unlike a legislature, could not revisit the cap when
146. See id.
147. See id. at 2627.
148. See id. at 2627-29.
149. Though not specifically mentioned by the Exxon Court, one can safely assume that the
Gore guideposts approach, as expounded in State Farm, qualifies as a “verbal approach.” See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418-28 (2003). Even with State
Farm’s 9:1 presumption, the constitutional approach remains quasi-quantitative at best, because
it still requires courts to consider a multitude of elusive factors that resemble the sorts of
abstract judicial review criteria criticized in Exxon. See id. at 425.
150. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2627-29.
151. Id. at 2628 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 2628-29 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mathias
v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)).
153. Id. at 2629 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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it needed “tinkering.”156 Courts must have an issue on the docket to take
action and thus would lack the flexibility of a legislature to modify a hard cap
whenever necessary.157
The Court eventually concluded that “[t]he more promising alternative
[was] to . . . peg[] punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio or
maximum multiple.”158 This was the preferred method because many states
and Congress had already adopted this model in other areas of law.159
Moreover, the Court reasoned that “the potential relevance of the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages is indisputable, being a central feature in
[the] due process analysis.”160 The Court anticipated and dismissed potential
criticism that this method resembled judicial legislation by explaining that its
duty as “a common law court of last review, faced with a perceived defect in
a common law remedy,” included crafting a solution to eliminate outlier
punitive damages awards.161 The Court further observed that because “courts
have [traditionally] accepted primary responsibility for reviewing punitive
damages and thus for their evolution,” the judiciary could not “wash its hands
of a problem it created, simply by calling quantified standards legislative.”162
Additionally, the Court referenced its decision in State Farm and reasoned that
“adopting an admiralty-law ratio is no less judicial than picking one as an
outer limit of constitutionality for punitive awards.”163
In an attempt to determine the appropriate ratio, the Court began by
surveying state and federal statutes adopting ratios.164 Although the Court
noted that a small majority of states using ratios have elected 3:1, it decided
that 3:1 was not a “reasonable limit” in the case at bar, which involved a
substantial recovery and only reckless action that was “profitless to the
tortfeasor.”165 The state 3:1 statutes apply to all types of cases, including those
featuring egregious and malicious conduct, so the Court reasoned that the 3:1
upper limit was not appropriate in a case involving conduct only slightly worse
than negligence.166 The Court also considered and rejected the 2:1 ratio used

156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2629-30.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2630 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003)).
164. See id. at 2631-32.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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in federal treble-damages statutes.167 These statutes, according to the Court,
apply to entirely different types of cases and often serve the dual function of
augmenting official enforcement of the law by creating incentives for private
litigation, a concern not present in the kind of case before the Court.168
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages across a broad spectrum of cases provides the best
evidence of the accepted limit for a reasonable punitive award.169 This ratio,
the Court said, “reflect[s] what juries and judges have considered reasonable
across many hundreds of punitive awards.”170 Relying on empirical studies of
land-based punitive damages awards,171 the Court determined that the median
ratio for all types of cases—ranging from those with the least blameworthy
conduct triggering punitive damages to those featuring malice—is less than
1:1.172 Thus, “given the need to protect against the possibility . . . of awards
that are unpredictable and unnecessary,” the Court concluded that a 1:1 ratio
marks the “fair upper limit” in maritime cases not featuring especially
blameworthy conduct.173 As additional support for the 1:1 ratio, the Court
cited its statement in State Farm that a 1:1 ratio may represent the
constitutional ceiling when a case involves substantial compensatory
damages.174 And in an intriguing footnote at the end of the opinion, the Court
observed that because of the substantial class recovery of over $507 million,
“[i]n this case, . . . the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1.”175
C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a two-sentence concurring
opinion in which he expressed his belief that the Court’s previous cases
imposing constitutional limits on punitive damages were wrongly decided.176
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
in which he argued that Congress, not the Court, should make the sort of
167. See id. at 2632.
168. See id. (noting that the rules governing patent, trademark, and antitrust cases are not
applicable in the maritime context and explaining that, in the antitrust context specifically,
Congress intended the treble damages remedy to encourage private suits as a means of
supplementing official enforcement of the law).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 2624-25 & n.14.
172. Id. at 2633.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2634 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003)).
175. Id. at 2634 n.28 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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empirical judgments expressed in the majority opinion.177 Although he
acknowledged that maritime law is judge made to a significant degree, Justice
Stevens argued that maritime law is now based primarily on federal statute
rather than common law.178 Citing several maritime statutes that could have
contained a limitation on punitive damages had Congress so intended, Justice
Stevens concluded that Congress had affirmatively chosen not to restrict the
availability of punitive damages in maritime law.179
Additionally, Justice Stevens found two problems with the Court’s
empirical approach. First, since maritime law restricts plaintiffs’ access to
compensatory damages more than land-based tort law, maritime punitive
damages may help compensate for certain types of injuries not otherwise fully
compensable.180 Second, Justice Stevens noted that legislatures rather than
courts typically impose ratios, because legislatures are better situated to
evaluate empirical data and balance policy considerations.181 For these
reasons, Justice Stevens favored judicial restraint and would have affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision using the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard.182
Justice Ginsburg also dissented from the punitive damages portion of the
majority opinion and expressed her view that the Court should have left the
matter to Congress.183 Though Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the Court
had the power to craft a numerical limitation on punitive damages in maritime
law,184 she echoed Justice Stevens’s concerns about the “venturesome
character of the Court’s decision” to impose a fixed ratio in the absence of
evidence that courts have traditionally acted in this manner.185 Additionally,
she questioned the need to depart from the common law approach to punitive
damages since the Court failed to note any problems with outlier punitive
damages awards in maritime cases.186 Even “assuming a problem in need of
177. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 2634-35.
179. See id. at 2635-36.
180. Id. at 2636-37.
181. Id. at 2637. In fact, Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority opinion cited no state
court that had ever “imposed a precise ratio . . . under its common-law authority.” Id.
182. Id. at 2635.
183. See id. at 2639-40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 2639. Because the Court acted under its common law authority, Justice Ginsburg
distinguished this case from “the Court’s recent forays into the domain of state tort law under
the banner of substantive due process.” Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Under the common law approach, “punitive damages are determined by a properly
instructed jury, followed by trial-court, and then appellate-court review, to ensure that [the
award] is reasonable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991)).
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solution,” Justice Ginsburg found the Court’s 1:1 ratio problematic because of
its uncertain application in cases with different facts and more egregious
conduct.187 Finally, Justice Ginsburg drew attention to the unresolved
questions concerning the broader significance of the Court’s opinion:
In the end, is the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime-law
ceiling, or is it also signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be
held to exceed “the constitutional outer limit”? On next
opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling
due process requires in all of the States, and for all federal
claims?188
Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part, contending that the
Court could have accomplished the objective of bringing uniformity and
certainty to punitive damages in maritime law “without the rigidity that an
absolute fixed numerical ratio demands.”189 Moreover, Justice Breyer argued
that the facts of this case warranted an exception to the Court’s 1:1 ratio since
a jury, the trial court, and the Ninth Circuit all had concluded that Exxon’s
conduct was egregious enough to justify an enormous punitive damages
award.190 Justice Breyer would have upheld the award because he found no
basis in the record for disagreeing with the lower courts’ characterization of
Exxon’s conduct as sufficiently reprehensible to warrant a punitive damages
award greater than the compensatory damages.191
IV. Implications Beyond the Maritime Arena: Why Exxon Foreshadows a
Constitutional Bright-Line Ratio
The Exxon decision ostensibly affects only a narrow category of cases and
adds nothing to the Supreme Court’s constitutional punitive damages
jurisprudence. Indeed, the majority made every effort to cabin its decision to
maritime law with the apparent intention of leaving Gore and State Farm
undisturbed.192 Nevertheless, although the precise holding in Exxon may be
narrow, the case is likely to have a substantial impact on the constitutional
187. See id. Justice Ginsburg questioned, “What ratio will the Court set for defendants who
acted maliciously or in pursuit of financial gain? Should the magnitude of the risk increase the
ratio and, if so, by how much?” Id. (citation omitted).
188. Id. (citation omitted).
189. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer
mentioned the Court’s constitutional approach as a flexible yet effective means of controlling
punitive awards. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 2626-27; see also supra text accompanying note 145.
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dimension of punitive damages law because State Farm failed to clearly define
when a punitive award violates due process.193 Instead, State Farm left lower
courts to grapple with the application of the “clarified” Gore guideposts.
Thus, the Court will inevitably confront a due process challenge to the size of
a state punitive damages award in the future,194 and the tortfeasor is certain to
rely heavily on Exxon when arguing that the award is excessive.195 At that
point, the Court will have two options: (1) ignore Exxon and somehow attempt
to refine the Gore guidepost approach, or (2) tread down the path created by
Exxon and adopt a mathematical bright line as part of the due process
guarantee.196 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will likely use Exxon
as the vehicle to finally establish a constitutional bright-line ratio.

193. See Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State Farm
Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 812 (2004) (“Although the Court obviously
intended State Farm to clarify past ambiguities and provide practical guidance to lower courts
considering punitive damage claims, an examination of a number of recent lower court cases
reveal [sic] that it fell seriously short in this endeavor. Moreover, State Farm raises new
questions about the demands of due process in the context of punitive damages, and it fails to
address several important issues left unresolved by its earlier cases. Even after State Farm, the
Court’s application of due process norms to punitive damages remains very much a work in
progress.”); id. at 800 (“State Farm’s warnings about excessive punitive damages ratios may
well have been loud, but they are far from clear.”); see also Jiang, supra note 11, at 799
(“Despite the State Farm I majority’s best efforts to create a more cohesive punitive damages
framework through the use of the [Gore] factors, it has resoundingly failed to achieve this
result.”).
194. See Lund, supra note 97, at 989 (“[I]f State Farm proves unable to constrain capricious
jury awards, it is likely that the analysis that Justice Scalia called the ‘road to nowhere’ and
‘insusceptible of principled application’ will again come before the Court . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
195. See Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 7, at 12.
196. See Lund, supra note 97, at 989 (noting that the Court will be forced to choose between
the guidepost approach, animated by a distrust of bright-line rules, and a defined numerical
limitation, animated by concerns for predictability and fairness); see also Toby J. Heytens,
Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2045, 2083 (2008) (“At some
point, the Justices may find themselves sufficiently informed to formulate—and willing to bear
the costs of implementing—a rule, and . . . impose an absolute . . . ratio with respect to
compensatory damages that punitive awards may not exceed . . . .”); Benjamin J. Robinson,
Comment, Distilling Minimum Due Process Requirements for Punitive Damages Awards:
Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), 60 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1006 (2008)
(noting that the most important remaining issue in punitive damages law is whether the Court
will use substantive due process to establish a bright-line restriction on the size of punitive
damages awards).
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A. The Considerations Driving the Court’s Maritime Law and Due Process
Analyses Are Identical and Should Produce Similar Rules
In formulating a 1:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio for maritime law, the
Court placed tremendous emphasis on fairness, predictability, and the need to
eliminate outlier punitive damages awards.197 Significantly, these exact same
concerns inform the Court’s judgment when it reviews state punitive awards
for conformity with the Constitution. Fairness and predictability lie at the
heart of due process.198 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Exxon majority
relied heavily on its due process decisions to conclude that high punitive-tocompensatory ratios are problematic in maritime law.199 Whether the Court is
applying the Constitution or maritime common law, it begins with the same
basic premise: excessive punitive damages awards are unreasonable and must
be judicially regulated. Reasonableness, a concept that encompasses fairness,
predictability, and nonarbitrariness, is the touchstone of an appropriate
punitive damages award in both contexts.
In Exxon, the Court took a significant step by judicially defining a
reasonable punitive damages award.200 Never before had the Court quantified
reasonableness. Gore merely provided a list of factors that bear on
reasonableness,201 while State Farm warned that punitive-to-compensatory
ratios exceeding single digits would rarely be reasonable.202 Exxon went
further by announcing that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages across hundreds of judge and jury verdicts represents the outer limit

197. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2625-27; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
198. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003)
(referring to “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence”
(alteration in original)); id. at 416-18 (discussing the problems with grossly excessive and
arbitrary punitive awards); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (explaining the importance of punitive damages standards that promote “the
uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself”); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (noting the importance of
reasonableness in the “constitutional calculus” (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18 (1991))); see also discussion supra Part II.
199. See 128 S. Ct. at 2625-26, 2629 (citing, inter alia, State Farm, 538 U.S. 408, Gore, 517
U.S. 559, and TXO, 509 U.S. 443); Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 7, at 12 (“That the court relied
so heavily on its prior due process pronouncements on punitives to conclude as a matter of
maritime law that high ratios are problematic will surely invite defendants to argue that the
court’s reasoning—if not its conclusion—should apply to a broader range of cases on
constitutional grounds.” (emphasis added)).
200. See 128 S. Ct. at 2632-33.
201. See 517 U.S. at 574-75.
202. See 538 U.S. at 425.
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of reasonableness for a punitive award.203 The Court then drew a bright line
to protect against “unpredictable and unnecessary” awards with ratios greater
than 1:1.204
Importantly, “neither the reasoning nor the authority relied on by the court
to establish this maritime rule dictate or suggest that a different result should
obtain in other cases.”205 In fact, the Court relied on land-based tort verdicts
to come up with its median ratio.206 Thus, the maritime context of the case was
in no way relevant to the Court’s determination of reasonableness. As one
prominent scholar has noted, the Court’s “reasoning was less about maritime
law and more about the need for predictable and consistent rules for punitive
damages awards.”207
Moreover, the Court did not attempt to offer a distinction between punitive
awards that are reasonable in maritime law and those that are reasonable as a
matter of constitutional law.208 Nor does any principled distinction exist when
identical concerns apply in both contexts. If 1:1 represents the upper limit of
a reasonable punitive award in maritime law, and no peculiar feature of
maritime law leads to that result, then surely 1:1 also marks the outermost
boundary of a reasonable award under the Constitution. Exxon fails to explain
why the appropriate size of a punitive damages award should depend on
whether the conduct subject to punishment occurred on navigable waters or on
land. Accordingly, when the Court confronts a due process challenge to the
size of a punitive damages award in the future, the most intellectually honest
and logically consistent response will be to hold that the Constitution limits
punitive damages to an amount equal to compensatory damages.
B. The Exxon Court Recognized the Inherent Flaws in the Court’s
Substantive Due Process Framework When It Rejected a Verbal Approach
to Reining in Punitive Damages Awards
Even if the Court can get past the general problem of identical
considerations resulting in different rules—perhaps by adopting a legal fiction
that reasonableness in maritime law differs from reasonableness in
constitutional law—Exxon casts doubt on the continuing validity of the
203. 128 S. Ct. at 2632-33.
204. Id. at 2633. Although the Court did not explicitly say that awards with ratios greater
than 1:1 are “unreasonable,” the Court’s description of such awards as “unpredictable” and
“unnecessary” plainly suggests that the Court believes them to be “unreasonable.”
205. Sotsky & Stuart, supra note 7, at 12.
206. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2624-25 & n.14.
207. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 62. Professor Chemerinsky nonetheless concluded that
Exxon is a “narrow ruling.” Id.
208. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2632-34.
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Court’s substantive due process approach for a more fundamental reason. The
Gore guidepost approach, as expounded in State Farm, has failed to achieve
the Court’s goal of bringing certainty and uniformity to punitive damages
law.209 The primary reason for this is that the Court has consistently refused
to draw a mathematical bright line.210 Rather than delineating clear
constitutional limits, the Court has instead opted for “laundry lists of
factors”211 that appear “insusceptible of principled application.”212 The Exxon
Court acknowledged this problem when it explained that verbal standards
would be incapable of bringing fairness and consistency to punitive damages
in maritime law.213 Indeed, the Court explicitly recognized the need for “more
rigorous standards than the constitutional limit”214 and expressed its doubt
“that anything but a quantified approach [would] work” to ensure the
reasonableness of maritime punitive awards.215
If maritime law demands a quantitative approach, then it would seem that
due process similarly requires a quantitative approach. After all, the
discussion of verbal approaches in Exxon indicates that the Gore guideposts
are simply too subjective, malleable, and unpredictable to control the size of
punitive awards.216 Perhaps not surprisingly, some scholars have suggested
approaching punitive damages with a framework similar to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines used in criminal law.217 Congress created the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for the same reason the Supreme Court ventured into
the realm of punitive damages: to promote uniformity.218 Adopting a standard
analogous to criminal sentencing guidelines would undoubtedly be more
effective in promoting uniformity than the Court’s current due process
209. See sources cited supra note 193.
210. See Hines, supra note 193, at 800 (noting that “the Court’s appropriate refusal to
announce a per se ratio” explains State Farm’s lack of clarity).
211. See Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain Schizophrenia in
Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197, 218 (2008).
212. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
213. See 128 S. Ct. at 2628-29 (2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
214. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629.
215. See id. at 2628.
216. See id. at 2628-29.
217. See, e.g., Green, supra note 211, at 218 (“[T]he Federal Sentencing Guidelines
represent a far more detailed assessment of the quantum of punishment appropriate to different
sorts of misbehavior than anything in the law of punitive damages. . . . Guidelines to govern
the size of punitive damages, akin to sentencing guidelines, may make more sense than the
current laundry lists of factors.”); Jiang, supra note 11, at 795 (recommending a set of
guidelines similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for determining the size of punitive
awards).
218. Jiang, supra note 11, at 824 (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)).
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approach, because “[i]nstead of being forced to grapple with inherently elusive
concepts like reprehensibility, potential harm, and comparable penalties,
judges . . . would have more concrete and objective criteria for adjudging the
constitutional propriety of punitive damages awards.”219 As the Exxon Court
stated, as long as punitive damages guidelines resembling criminal sentencing
guidelines do not exist, “it is inevitable that the specific amount of punitive
damages awarded . . . will be arbitrary.”220
One of the primary obstacles to adopting punitive damages guidelines is
logistical: the Court itself cannot draft a set of guidelines, and no other
institution has endeavored to do so.221 This reality leaves the Court in a bind.
On the one hand, the Court needs quantified limits “more rigorous” than the
constitutional guideposts to eliminate “unpredictable outlying punitive
awards.”222 On the other hand, the Court lacks both the power and the
institutional capacity to create a framework akin to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.223
Exxon solves the Court’s problem. A 1:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio
would be easier to apply and result in more predictable punitive awards than
the Gore guideposts.224 In fact, such a ratio would be even more effective in
promoting certainty and uniformity than criminal sentencing guidelines,
because it would leave no room for discretion in most cases.225 If the Gore
guideposts are not rigorous enough to eliminate outlier punitive damage
awards, the Court must inevitably explore the possibility of adopting a
constitutional bright line to satisfy the well-established due process
requirement of reasonableness.226 Continued adherence to the Gore guideposts
would be inconsistent with Exxon’s rejection of verbal approaches to
restraining punitive awards.
219. Id.
220. 128 S. Ct. at 2628-29 (quoting Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672,
678 (7th Cir. 2003)).
221. See Jiang, supra note 11, at 826.
222. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629.
223. Cf. Jiang, supra note 11, at 813 (discussing the process by which the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were developed and later adopted by Congress).
224. But see Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (questioning how the 1:1 ratio would apply in cases with more egregious conduct).
225. To the extent that the Court left room for exceptions to the 1:1 rule—perhaps in cases
featuring conduct more reprehensible than recklessness or cases with moderate compensatory
damages—there would be some discretion despite the bright-line rule. See id. at 2633 (majority
opinion) (“In a well-functioning system, we would expect that awards at the median or lower
would roughly express jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of
exceptional blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum . . . and cases . . . without the
modest economic harm or odds of detection that have opened the door to higher awards.”).
226. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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C. The Court Has Already Expressly Intertwined Exxon with State Farm
Despite an Ostensible Effort to Treat the Two Analyses as Distinct
The Exxon Court went to great lengths to emphasize the differences
between its maritime common law analysis and due process review of punitive
damages awards.227 It was careful to point out that the exercise of its “federal
maritime common law authority . . . precede[d] and . . . obviate[d] any
application of the constitutional standard,”228 thereby confining its actual
holding to the narrow maritime context of the case. Nonetheless, the last part
of the majority opinion brings the Constitution to the forefront by explicitly
discussing State Farm.229 This portion of the Court’s opinion suggests that
Exxon will be highly persuasive the next time the Court hears a constitutional
challenge to a punitive damages award. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg observed,
the Court may have already signaled that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held
to violate due process in the future.230
Given the nature of the Court’s references to State Farm, it is hard to
believe that Exxon will not have an impact in the due process context. As part
of the justification for its newly created 1:1 ratio, the Court cited State Farm’s
observation that a 1:1 ratio may mark the constitutional ceiling in cases
involving substantial compensatory damages.231
And because the
compensatory award in Exxon met the Court’s definition of “substantial,”
Justice Souter plainly stated in a footnote that “the constitutional outer limit
[in this case] may well be 1:1.”232 These statements not only provide support
for Exxon’s ratio but also strengthen State Farm and likely signal the future of
due process punitive damages jurisprudence. Exxon’s ratio stood on firm
ground independent of any language in State Farm because of the Court’s
power as “a common law court of last review.”233 The Court did not need to
broaden the discussion to include the 1:1 ratio that “may” exist under State
Farm, nor did it need to surmise what “may” have happened had the Court
decided the case under the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Exxon majority might have included the language about the
Constitution to set the stage for its next due process case. Without the nod of
approval from Exxon, State Farm’s discussion of a possible 1:1 ratio in some
227. See 128 S. Ct. at 2626-27; see also supra text accompanying note 145.
228. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
229. See id. at 2634 & n.28; see also supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
230. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also supra text accompanying note 188.
231. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (majority opinion).
232. Id. at 2634 n.28.
233. See id. at 2629.
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cases would have remained speculative, confusing, and of limited precedential
value.234 Now, even though the Exxon Court did not technically add anything
to State Farm, the Court’s message is clear. By endorsing State Farm’s
language about a 1:1 ratio in a decision explicitly adopting a 1:1 ratio, and by
noting that the Constitution might have required a 1:1 ratio on Exxon’s facts,235
the Court has all but drawn a constitutional bright line in cases with substantial
compensatory damages. Now that the Court has intertwined Exxon and State
Farm in a meaningful way, all that remains is for the Court to rely on both
cases and specifically hold that the Constitution mandates a 1:1 maximum
ratio.
D. Exxon Reflects Two Decades of Judicial Hostility to Large Punitive
Awards and Represents the Next Logical Step in the Court’s Evolving Due
Process Framework
The Exxon decision is hardly surprising in light of the cases that preceded
it and the Court’s growing activism in the punitive damages arena.236 Since the
1990s, the Court has demonstrated an increasing willingness to interfere with
state punitive damages awards under the guise of substantive due process.237
In Haslip and TXO, the Court first recognized that the Due Process Clause
places restrictions on the size of punitive awards.238 Although it refused to
overturn awards in those cases, the Court set the stage for a more searching
examination of state punitive awards a few years later. In Gore and State
Farm, the Court became more active by setting aside excessive state punitive
awards, but it still refused to impose a numerical ceiling on punitive
damages.239 Nonetheless, the State Farm Court moved closer to a bright-line
rule by creating a presumption against punitive-to-compensatory ratios greater
than 9:1 and stating that 1:1 may be the constitutional outer limit in cases with
substantial compensatory damages.240 Finally, although Exxon arose in a
234. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
235. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 & n.28.
236. See Chris Bergen, Note, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Supreme Court Tightens
the Purse Strings on Corporate Punitive Awards, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 154 (2008) (“The
Court’s decision to further restrain punitive awards is also apt, given the jurisprudence that led
up to the noted case. The noticeable tightening of punitive awards is evident in the Court’s
reaction to a 500:1 ratio in Gore, which was reiterated in State Farm’s holding that punitive
damages should be at or near the amount of compensatory damages. It seemed likely that the
Court would continue to curb punitive awards given its evident concern about the fairness and
unpredictability involved in punitive damage calculations.”).
237. See discussion supra Part II.
238. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
239. See discussion supra Part II.C-D.
240. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); see also
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different context than the Court’s due process cases, the Court continued its
trend of closely policing punitive damages and went one step beyond State
Farm by explicitly adopting a rigid mathematical limitation on the size of
punitive awards.241
This series of cases leads to one inescapable conclusion: the Supreme Court
is hostile to large punitive damages awards.242 Over the last twenty years, the
Court has exhibited a growing desire to take stronger measures to restrict the
size of punitive awards, “either through procedural due process, substantive
due process, or a federal common law 1:1 ratio rule.”243 A Court that is wary
of large punitive awards and becoming progressively more active in limiting
punitive damages244 should soon be prepared to incorporate Exxon’s 1:1 ratio
into constitutional law.245 Indeed, given that the State Farm Court already
suggested a 1:1 ceiling in cases with substantial compensatory damages246—a
point cited with approval in Exxon247—the Court need not make a large leap
to rule that the Constitution requires a 1:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio in
at least some types of cases. The Exxon decision merely represents the next
logical step in the evolution of the Court’s substantive due process framework
and provides the Court with the precedential foundation to finally draw a
constitutional bright-line restriction on punitive awards—a direction in which
the Court has been moving for almost two decades.

supra text accompanying notes 95-97, 100.
241. See discussion supra Part III.B.
242. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 63; see also MACDOUGALL, supra note 8, at 82
(noting that Exxon provides “strong evidence of the Supreme Court’s judicial dislike of punitive
damages or at least dislike of what the Court considers outlier awards”).
243. MACDOUGALL, supra note 8, at 83.
244. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634-35 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint since Congress had affirmatively chosen not to act); id. at 2639-40 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court, though competent to act,
should have left the matter to Congress); see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 438-39 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for acting like a legislature and imposing numerical
constraints on state punitive damages awards through the Due Process Clause); MACDOUGALL,
supra note 8, at 83 (“Exxon Shipping provides further proof that the Court has an arguable
tendency to engage in judicial legislation in creating limitations on punitive damages . . . .”).
245. Cf. Bergen, supra note 236, at 157 (noting that Exxon will likely have a significant
impact in other areas of law because of “the Court’s desire to curb excessive punitive awards”).
246. 538 U.S. at 425; see also supra text accompanying note 100.
247. See 128 S. Ct. at 2634.
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V. Conclusion
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court placed a fixed
numerical ceiling on a punitive damages award for the first time when it held
that a punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1 marks the fair upper limit in
maritime cases. The Court departed from precedent in that it had always been
unwilling to draw bright mathematical lines when reviewing state punitive
awards for conformity with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But, unlike in previous cases, the Court in Exxon examined a
punitive award in the exercise of its federal maritime common law authority,
unconstrained by the Constitution and its due process precedents. The Court
endeavored to confine its holding to the narrow maritime context of the case,
but multiple aspects of the decision indicate that Exxon will ultimately spill
over into the Court’s constitutional framework.
The same considerations underlying the creation of a ratio in Exxon also
drive the Court’s constitutional approach to reviewing punitive awards.
Furthermore, the Exxon Court recognized the inherent deficiencies in the
Court’s current substantive due process approach and took an unprecedented
step by rejecting elusive verbal constraints in favor of a rigid numerical
limitation on the size of punitive awards. Additionally, the Court expressly
intertwined Exxon with its most recent due process case in a way that strongly
suggests that the Court is close to drawing a constitutional bright-line
restriction on punitive damages. Finally, the Exxon decision marks the
culmination of two decades of judicial hostility to large punitive awards and
represents the next logical development in the Court’s due process framework.
For these reasons, Exxon lays the foundation for the Court to take another step
in the evolution of its punitive damages jurisprudence and implement a
constitutional bright-line rule in the near future. This ostensibly narrow
maritime decision has the potential to revolutionize the law of punitive
damages.
Michael L. Brooks

